Yu v. Superior Court, No. B304011 (D2d3 Oct. 27, 2020)
The parties here agreed to resolve their dispute before a referee under a general judicial reference authorized by Code of Civil Procedure § 638(a). The referee issued an award of about $7 million to Plaintiff and submitted his findings and conclusions to the trial court. The trial court, however, found that the referee’s was tainted by legal error. Before judgment was entered, the court ruled that a new trial would be permitted and that the new trial would be before the court, not the referee. Plaintiff took a writ.
There are two closely related questions at issue here: (1) did the court had the authority to decline to enter judgment on the award; and (2) had judgment been entered, did the court have the authority to order a new trial. The answers to those questions come down §§ 644 and 645.
Section 644 says a referee’s decision stands as a decision of the court and, once filed with the court, “judgment may be entered thereon in the same manner as if the action had been tried by the court.” Section 645, in turn, says that a referee’s decision “may be excepted to and reviewed in like manner as if made by the court.”
Although neither party so argued, the Court of Appeal funds that § 644 did not authorize the trial court to decline to enter judgment due to legal error. Section § 644 directs the court to treat the referee’s decision as “if the action had been tried by the court.” And the statute that addresses entry of judgment after a court trial—§ 664—, directs the clerk to enter judgment “immediately upon the filing of such decision.” Thus, notwithstanding the use of the word “may,” the trial court did not have any discretion to decline to enter judgment based on the referee’s decision.
Indeed, that jives with § 645, which basically says that post-judgment remedies apply to the judgement entered on the referee’s decision. These include all of the myriad post-judgment motions available under state law—new trial motions, jnovs, motions to vacate, motions to correct, etc. So although it was error to order a new trial before judgment was entered, it would have been fine to do so afterwards, assuming the new trial procedure had been complied with.
Finally, given that the trial court had the authority to decide and order a new trial, it was also not error for the trial court to order the new trial before the court, not the referee. Here, the parties’ reference agreement agreed that the referee would conduct any proceedings authorized “in a trial,” which included pretrial, but not post-trial proceedings. That having been satisfied, the reference expired, and the powers conferred by the stipulation to a referee exhausted. So the trial court had the power to order the new trial to be conducted before the court. In getting to this result, the Court distinguishes an earlier case where the parties stipulation agreed that the referee could conduct all proceedings necessary to a “complete and final adjudication.” See Clark v. Rancho, 216 Cal. App. 3d 606, 623 (1989). Given that language, the parties in Clark assented to the referee conducting a new trial as well.
Writ granted with instructions to: (1) vacate the pre-judgment order setting aside the award; (2) deny the motion to set aside the award; (3) enter judgment on the award; (4) grant a new trial to be conducted by the court.