Richmond Compassionate Care Collective. v. 7 Stars Holistic Found., No. A154581 (D1d2 Mar. 15, 2019)
This is an appeal of an attorney fee award following a partial grant of an anti-SLAPP motion in this case. The trial court generally denied the motion but struck a handful of allegations within Plaintiffs’ Cartwright Act claim—relying on the Supreme Court’ recent decision inBaral v. Schnitt. Most of the claim, however, was left standing. The trial court granted a motion for fees under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(c), but cut the award way down based on the limited success achieved. Plaintiffs appeal.
Plaintiffs don’t quibble with the amount of the award. Instead, they claim the award was impermissible under the Cartwright Act. Their argument appears to be: (1) the Cartwright Act permits a prevailing plaintiff to recover its attorneys’ fees; (2) courts have read that to mean that a prevailing defendant is not entitled to a fee award; and therefore (3) § 425.16(c) doesn’t authorize a fee award to a prevailing anti-SLAPP defendant because it conflicts with the Cartwright Act.
The problem with that argument, however, is that the cases that say a defendant can’t get fees under the Cartwright Act reach that result because that is unauthorized by statute. But § 425.16 is a statute. And it authorizes an award. So there’s no conflict at all between the Cartwright Act and § 425.16(c).
Affirmed.
This is an appeal of an attorney fee award following a partial grant of an anti-SLAPP motion in this case. The trial court generally denied the motion but struck a handful of allegations within Plaintiffs’ Cartwright Act claim—relying on the Supreme Court’ recent decision inBaral v. Schnitt. Most of the claim, however, was left standing. The trial court granted a motion for fees under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(c), but cut the award way down based on the limited success achieved. Plaintiffs appeal.
Plaintiffs don’t quibble with the amount of the award. Instead, they claim the award was impermissible under the Cartwright Act. Their argument appears to be: (1) the Cartwright Act permits a prevailing plaintiff to recover its attorneys’ fees; (2) courts have read that to mean that a prevailing defendant is not entitled to a fee award; and therefore (3) § 425.16(c) doesn’t authorize a fee award to a prevailing anti-SLAPP defendant because it conflicts with the Cartwright Act.
The problem with that argument, however, is that the cases that say a defendant can’t get fees under the Cartwright Act reach that result because that is unauthorized by statute. But § 425.16 is a statute. And it authorizes an award. So there’s no conflict at all between the Cartwright Act and § 425.16(c).
Affirmed.